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SUPREME 
COURT WATCH 
By Reginald C. Oh 
T he U.S. Supreme Court wrapped up its 2002-03 Term by handing down several key Fourteenth Amendment equal protection decisions. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 
S. Ct. 2325 (2003), and in the companion case Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003), the Court established that 
narrowly tailored race conscious affirmative action programs 
can indeed survive heightened judicial scrutiny. In Gruffer, 
the Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School's 
affirmative action policy as a narrowly tailored use of race, but 
in Gratz, the Court struck down the University ofMichigan's 
undergraduate affirmative action admissions policy because 
the Court concluded that the policy in effect acted as a rigid 
quota and hence was not narrowly tailored. 
In Gruffer, a white student applied for admissions to the 
University ofMichigan Law School and had her application 
denied. The student then filed a lawsuit against the law 
school in federal district court, alleging that the law school's 
policy of considering race as a factor in its admissions crite-
ria violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause. The district court in Gruffer struck 
down the law school's admissions policy, as it determined 
that the law school's interest in using race to attain a racially 
diverse student body was not a compelling state interest and 
that even if it were, that the law school's policy was not nar-
rowly tailored to further that interest. 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, 
holding that based on the Bakke precedent, the interest in 
racial diversity is a compelling state interest, and further, that 
the law school's use of race was narrowly tailored because it 
was only a factor in the school's admission decision and did 
not operate as a rigid quota mandating that certain seats be 
reserved for racial minority students. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to plaintiff's ap-
peal, and in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the 
Court voted 5-4 to uphold the law school's affirmative action 
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program. (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter 
joined the majority decision. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and 
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas dissented.) 
Justice O'Connor acted as the swing vote in the close de-
cision, as she voted to uphold the affirmative action program 
in Gruffer, even though in two previous affirmative action de-
cisions, Justice O'Connor had written the majority decision 
in which the Court struck down race conscious affirmative 
action programs. In Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), 
O'Connor voted to strike down a federal government minor-
ity business set-aside, and in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 
U.S. 469 (1989), she voted to strike down a local government 
minority business set-aside. Perhaps an explanation for 
O'Connor's change in positions can be attributed to the fact 
that in Adarand and Croson, the Court was dealing with race 
conscious remedies in government contracting, whereas 
Gruffer involved the use of race in higher public education 
admissions practices. 
Grutter is an important decision, as it clarified several is-
sues left open by the Court's earlier affirmative action deci-
sions. For the first time, a majority of the Justices agreed that 
the goal of having a racially diverse student body is a com-
pelling state interest under equal protection strict scrutiny. 
Under equal protection doctrine, any racial classification en-
acted by the government must be subject to the two-prong 
strict scrutiny test. First, the court must determine if the state 
has a compelling state interest, and if so, whether the policy or 
statute is narrowly tailored to further that compelling state 
interest. What was contested in this case was whether the 
promotion of diversity in higher education should be con-
sidered a compelling state interest. 
The racial diversity rationale was first developed and dis-
cussed in Bakke v. University of California, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978), in which Justice Powell, in a plurality opinion that 
failed to command a majority of the Justices, held that a state 
may constitutionally use race conscious affirmative action 
programs to ensure a diverse student body. In Grutter, Justice 
O'Connor quoted extensively from Powell's Bakke opinion 
and reaffirmed Powell's assertion that diversity is a com-
pelling state interest firmly grounded in the First Amend-
ment principle that a paramount goal of educational institu-
tions is to select students who will contribute to a "robust 
exchange of ideas." Accordingly,Justice O'Connor concluded 
that the Court must give some deference to an educational 
institution when it declares that a racially diverse student 
body is necessary for it to effectively advance its First 
Amendment-based pedagogical mission. 
Once Justice O'Connor established that institutions of 
public higher education may give preferences to racial minor-
ity applicants in order to further the compelling state inter-
est in attaining a diverse student body, she then applied the 
second prong of the strict scrutiny test, and determined that 
the law school's admissions policy was narrowly tailored to 
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further its interest in a diverse student body. The key point for 
O'Connor was that the law school's admissions policy as-
sessed each applicant in a highly individualized, flexible, 
"holistic" manner, in which "race" was but one factor among 
several considerations that the law school took into account 
in making its admissions decisions. 
Moreover, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the law 
school's policy makes clear that when it states that its goal is to 
have a diverse student body, it uses the term "diversity" in the 
broadest sense, and that the law school gives "substantial 
weight to diversity factors besides race." The law school's pol-
icy, noted O'Connor, "makes clear that there are many possi-
ble bases for diversity admissions, and provides examples of 
admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad, are flu-
ent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and 
family hardship, have exceptional records of extensive com-
munity service, and have had successful careers in other 
fields." That the law school frequently admitted nonminority 
candidates with lower grades and test scores over qualified un-
derrepresented racial minorities helped to convince O'Connor 
that the law school truly applied its admissions policy in a flex-
ible manner and did not operate as a de facto "quota system." 
While upholding the government's ability to enact race 
conscious affirmative action programs, Justice O'Connor 
ended her opinion by emphasizing that "any race conscious 
admissions policies must be limited in time." She admon-
ished the law school to keep its word to "terminate its race-
conscious admissions programs as soon as possible" and con-
cluded by predicting that "in 25 years from now, the use of 
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
interest approved today." Justice O'Connor seemed to be 
sending the message that affirmative action has a twenty-five 
year time limit, and that if the law school or any other public 
education institution is still relying on race conscious admis-
sions policies, then the Court would more likely than not 
strike such programs down as unnecessary reliance on race. 
Although the Grutter decision reaffirmed the government's 
ability and authority to use race conscious measures as a way 
to open up educational opportunities for underrepresented 
racial minorities in higher education, it did so in a way to min-
imize and deflect attention away from the primary goal of af-
firmative action programs: the promotion of equality of oppor-
tunity for disadvantaged racial groups in the United States. 
The Court emphasized the important pedagogical benefits 
that a diverse student body provides for students of all races 
and emphasized the importance of a diverse student body as a 
way to further the First Amendment value of academic free-
dom. Yet, it failed to explicitly recognize the systemic factors 
that make affirmative action programs necessary-the con-
tinuing socioeconomic inequalities experienced by African-
Americans, Latino-Americans, and Native Americans. 
Such an omission did not escape the attention ofJustice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who, in a concurring opinion joined 
by Justice Breyer, made sure to emphasize what Justice O' -
Connor did not in her majority opinion: that "conscious and 
unconscious race bias, even rank discrimination on the basis 
of race, remain alive in our land, impeding realization of our 
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highest values and ideals." Justice Ginsburg cited to statistics 
showing that African-American and Hispanic students con-
tinue to experience racial segregation in elementary and sec-
ondary public schools, and that such students in many states 
are lacking in educational resources. Although Justice 
O'Connor seemed to place the responsibility on the law 
school to ensure that it will not have to use race conscious 
measures in twenty-five years, Justice Ginsburg made sure 
to emphasize that whether the law school and other institu-
tions need to use affirmative action programs in twenty-five 
years will depend on circumstances beyond their control, and 
that, depending on whether equal educational opportunity in 
America's primary and secondary public schools is achieved, 
the law school may still need to rely on race conscious mea-
sures even twenty-five years from now. 
However, even though Justice O'Connor's opinion could 
have more explicitly recognized the central role that continu-
ing socioeconomic inequality continues to hamper the edu-
cational opportunities of underrepresented racial minorities, 
her opinion does leave an opening for legal advocates to de-
velop new theories to justify the use of race conscious mea-
sures in the education and government procurement context. 
For example, the Court clarified an important question re-
garding the equal protection strict scrutiny test. An issue that 
had split the circuit courts was whether the only interest a state 
could put forth to justify its use of a racial classification is the 
interest in remedying the effects ofits own past racial discrim-
ination. The Court clearly rejected this narrow interpretation 
of the Court's equal protection doctrine and held that the gov-
ernment may be able to articulate other interests that may meet 
the "compelling interest" standard besides the interest in reme-
dying one's own past discrimination. Hence, in Grutter, the 
Court held that the attainment of a diverse student body is a 
"compelling interest" for purposes of equal protection. 
Grutter therefore opens up the possibility that, in addi-
tion to the remedying past discrimination and promoting di-
versity rationales, the Court may accept other rationales for 
affirmative action as "compelling state interests," in addition 
to diversity interest and remedying past discrimination inter-
est. For legal advocates seeking to develop alternative com-
pelling interests to justify affirmative action, the Grutterdeci-
sion strongly suggests that the Court is more likely to accept 
an interest as compelling if that interest is rooted in a consti-
tutional principle, just as the diversity rationale is rooted in 
the First Amendment. Thus, using similar reasoning, the 
government may rely on Grutter to use other constitutional 
amendments as the basis for articulating a compelling state 
interest for equal protection strict scrutiny purposes. 
For example, government institutions, instead of using the 
First Amendment based student body diversity rationale, 
could instead justify their affirmative action programs as a 
way to further the compelling state interest in attaining a 
racially integrated student body, an interest that is rooted in 
both the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against slav-
ery and the badges and incidents of slavery and the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibition against de Jure segregation. 
See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, 
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and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv.1195 (2002) (articulat-
ing racial integration as a compelling state interest under 
equal protection strict scrutiny analysis). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to fully lay 
out how the Thirteenth Amendment can be used as the basis 
for justifying racial integration as a compelling state interest, 
a few tentative points can be made. Under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the federal and state governments have a duty 
to eliminate the existence of slavery or the badges and inci-
dents of slavery, regardless of whether or not "state action" has 
caused or contributed to the existence of such. It could bear-
gued that racial groups that suffer from the badges and inci-
dents of slavery are those groups who continue to be saddled 
with indicia ofinferiority and second-class citizenship status. 
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment could provide the ratio-
nale for an affirmative action program focused on eliminat-
ing the indicia of racial inferiority and second-class status 
that saddle certain historically disadvantaged racial groups. 
There are several advantages to justifying affirmative ac-
tion on racial integration grounds rather than racial diversity 
grounds. First, an affirmative action program seeking to pro-
mote racial integration in the student body and society as a 
whole would put attention directly on the continuing exis-
tence of socioeconomic racial inequality in the United States. 
Such a rationale would be truer to the spirit and purpose of 
the Reconstruction Amendments than the First Amend-
ment based racial diversity rationale. Second, when an affir-
mative action program is justified on grounds that it is seek-
ing to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery, it cannot 
be forced to be "sunset" or ended prematurely, because the 
duty to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery ends 
only when such treatment of racial groups is thoroughly 
eradicated from society. To be sure, Justice O'Connor's con-
cerns that race conscious policies will turn into a permanent 
racial spoils system are valid, and any attempt to argue for the 
continuing necessity of race conscious measures must ade-
quately address such concerns. 
Third, the Thirteenth Amendment interest in racial in-
tegration as a way to eliminate the badges and incidents of 
slavery also could justify the use of race conscious measures to 
remedy continuing societal racial inequality. While the Court 
has held that the government may use a racial classification to 
remedy past identified discrimination, it has suggested that 
it may not enact affirmative action programs to remedy the 
effects of"societal discrimination." In other words, the Court 
has been reluctant to uphold affirmative action programs 
seeking to address the effects of continuing socioeconomic 
racial inequality in the United States. The Court has never 
had to decide, however, whether the government has the au-
thority to remedy societal racial inequality as a way to pursue 
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the goals of the Thirteenth Amendment. Because the cen-
tral purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment is to prohibit and 
eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery in society, it 
would seem logical that it could provide the legal justification 
for enacting affirmative action programs that specifically seek 
to remedy"societal discrimination." 
By no means does the Grutter case signal that the Court is 
now more open to arguments seeking to expand the scope of 
affirmative action. At the very least, however, Grutter has given 
legal advocates and government institutions at least a twenty-
five year time frame to develop new programs to ensure ade-
quate representation of racial minorities in higher education. 
Finally, in the companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the 
Court reaffirmed Grutter's holding that the government has a 
compelling state interest in furthering racial diversity. In 
Gratz, however, a case involving an equal protection chal-
lenge to the University of Michigan undergraduate admis-
sions policy, the Court, in a 6-3 decision written by Justice 
William Rehnquist, struck down the undergraduate admis-
sions policy, holding that the practice of giving certain under-
represented racial minorities 20 points of the 100 points 
needed to gain admissions was not narrowly tailored to fur-
ther its compelling interest in racial diversity. The primary 
difference between the law school policy and the undergrad-
uate policy was while the law school policy was administered 
in a highly individualized, holistic manner, in which racial 
minorities were not guaranteed a slot by virtue of their racial 
minority status, the undergraduate policy, by automatically 
giving 20 points to underrepresented racial minorities in ef-
fect guaranteed their admissions to the school, and thus, for 
the Court, the policy operated as an unconstitutional "de 
facto" racial quota. 
The SEC Sends a Message 
(continued from page 1) 
investment risks of the particular bonds and accounting prac-
tices of municipal issuers in both primary disclosure docu-
ments (the basic bond offering materials) and also secondary 
disclosures-after the bonds have been sold to investors and 
are being traded in the market. 
The SEC has been active in taking actions against munic-
ipalities that did not disclose bad financial news in bond doc-
uments. The SEC took action against Maricopa County, 
Arizona, for failing to disclose a decline in its financial posi-
tion and the necessity for it to use bond proceeds to balance 
its budget. Maricopa County, Arizona, Securities Act of 
1933 Rel. No. 33-7354 (Oct. 3, 1996). Likewise, the SEC 
took action against the City of Syracuse for misstating in 
bond documents a budget surplus when a deficit actually ex-
isted and for characterizing unaudited financial statements as 
having been audited. City of Syracuse, New York, Securities 
Act of1933 Rel. No. No. 33-7460 (Sept. 30, 1997). 
In perhaps the most significant enforcement action in re-
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cent years, the SEC took aim at Miami's disclosures during 
times of financial difficulty. In the early 1990s, the City of 
Miami began experiencing fiscal difficulties. City of Miami, 
supra. The city's financial advisers and auditors warned that it 
would run out of operating cash. Id. At a meeting of senior 
city staff, one elected commissioner, and mid-level staff, to 
discuss the potential and (under Florida law, illegal) operat-
ing deficit for FY 1994, the participants determined that 
based on past experience, the city council would not raise 
taxes or increase fees. Id. The only way they believed they 
could balance the budget was to issue bonds and use the bond 
proceeds to finance city operations. Id. The city began a pro-
gram to eliminate waste and redundancy within the munici-
pal government, but this program would not seriously impact 
the operating deficit confronting the city. Id. The city's finan-
cial condition continued to deteriorate and the city eventu-
ally declared a fiscal emergency, prompting the governor to 
appoint a fiscal oversight board to take control of the city's 
finances. Id. 
Before the appointment of the state oversight board, the 
city faced enough of an operating deficit that it could not pay 
its bills and employees through legal means. Id. Nevertheless, 
despite the deterioration of its financial condition from bad 
to worse, in the official statements for three bond issues dur-
ing this time, the city represented its budget to be balanced. 
Id. The disconnect between the city's financial position as de-
scribed in the official statements for the bond issues and the 
city's financial position as described in its audits and com-
prehensive annual financial reports was problematic for the 
SEC. As the SEC dryly observed, "A reasonable investor 
would have considered it important to know that Miami 
could not generate sufficient revenues to pay its bills or em-
ployees. The fact that Miami needed to use bond proceeds 
to satisfy operational expenses demonstrated the gravity ofits 
cash flow deficit, and, thus, the City's need to disclose this 
fact to public investors and the market place." Id. 
Miami countered by arguing that its auditors had not is-
sued a "going concern" qualification to its financial report. 
Id. A "going concern" qualification indicates that the subject 
will not be able to meet its obligations in the next twelve 
months. The SEC found, however, that only the infusion of 
bond proceeds prevented the auditors from giving a going 
concern qualification. In other words, only the illegal use of 
bond proceeds enabled Miami to argue that it did not merit a 
going concern qualification. 
Miami also argued that it had relied on its auditors and 
other professionals for information on what to disclose in its 
official statements. Id. The SEC rejected this argument on 
two grounds. First, "Primary responsibility for the accuracy of 
information filed with the Commission and disseminated 
among investors rests upon the municipality." Id. Second, the 
SEC noted, "the record is unclear as to whether and to what 
extent Miami consulted with or relied on professionals." Id. 
The SEC also found that Miami had acted with scienter, 
based on circumstantial evidence concerning what its officials 
knew, but also upon the city's dismissal of the importance of 
the bond documents, as evidenced by the testimony of its 
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then city manager quoted at the beginning of this essay. Id 
What then, are elected laypeople to make of these actions? 
On the one hand, trying to ascertain whether a municipality 
relies too much on interest income seems a little much to ask 
of politicians. On the other hand, the failure to mention in 
bond documents that the municipality has trouble meeting 
payroll seems akin to lying on a mortgage application. More-
over, blaming the finance professionals does not seem to be a 
productive strategy. To the extent that the SEC has to both-
er with a municipal debt issue, it is a safe bet that the SEC 
will be examining the conduct of all the professionals con-
nected with the transaction. 
The dangers inherent in the blame the professionals ap-
proach are obvious in the Miami litigation. First, the SEC re-
iterated that professionals notwithstanding, the primary re-
sponsibility for accuracy of information in an official 
statement lies with the issuer. Second, the SEC questioned 
the record evidence concerning how much the city had, in 
fact, relied on professional advice. One may well question the 
degree of finger pointing and backside covering going on 
from the financing professionals back toward the city. The 
third consequence is found in statements in the SEC opinion: 
"The fact that Miami has pointed its finger at Deloitte, and 
other bond professionals, without taking any responsibility for 
its own conduct, suggests that Miami has not accepted fully its 
responsibility for the City's financial disclosures .... The City 
must be given the clear message ... that Miami is responsible 
for the adequacy of its financial disclosures when seeking 
money from the investing public." City of Miami, supra. No-
tionally, it is a bad thing when a federal regulatory agency feels 
compelled to "send a message" to a municipality. 
There are, however, general steps and specific steps that, 
if taken, could prevent municipalities from having to receive 
messages from federal regulators. At the general level, lay 
elected officials must have some awareness of the financial 
condition of their municipality. They must pay attention to 
what is going on around them. They must also respect the 
bond documents. It is no longer acceptable to have a "who 
reads these documents?" attitude. 
As a specific guide, there are certain questions that elected 
officials should ask and to which they should receive answers. 
The questions are found in a brochure the SEC published in 
1996, entitled "(),!iestions to Ask Before You Approve a 
Bond Issue."This brochure contains ten questions elected of-
ficials should ask themselves and their staffs and five ques-
tions that they should ask their outside professionals. The 
questions are set forth below. If these questions are asked, and 
accurately answered, and the elected officials make their de-
cisions based on these answers, elected officials can avoid the 
need for the SEC to have to send them a message. 
<zyestions Officials Should Ask Themselves 
and Their Staffs 
1. How have we allocated responsibilities for the preparation 
of the official statement? Have we clearly defined the re-
sponsibilities of all participants in the transaction? 
2. What processes or procedures have been established to se-
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lect qualified outside professionals? How are we relying on 
them and is our reliance appropriate? How are they being 
compensated? 
3. What have we done to establish the accuracy of financial 
and operating information and its disclosure in the official 
statement? Has anything happened since the date of the 
financial statements that needs to be disclosed? 
4. What policies and procedures have we developed to de-
termine whether material conflicts of interest exist that 
need to be disclosed? 
5. What procedures have we established to accurately de-
scribe the project, the bond terms, the sources of repay-
ment, and the risks associated with the project? What pro-
cedures have we established for the investment and 
disbursement of the bond proceeds? 
6. Do our procedures permit the underwriters to carry out 
their "due diligence" and other responsibilities? 
7. Have we fully considered any questions asked by the rat-
ing agencies? 
8. What continuing disclosure responsibilities have we as-
sumed and what procedures have we established to meet 
them? Who will determine and file the annual financial 
and material event disclosure information? Have we des-
ignated an individual to speak to the market on our be-
half? 
9. If we are relying on the bond counsel, financial advisor, or 
trustee to evaluate and meet our continuing disclosure re-
quirements, what procedures are in place to keep them ap-
prised of our financial condition and other material infor-
mation? 
10.Have our procedures produced an official statement that 
we feel accurately presents our financial condition and dis-
closes the information a reasonable investor needs to 
know? Have all the right people reviewed it? 
Questions Officials Should Ask Outside Professionals 
1. What is the nature or scope of the written opinion or cer-
tification, if any, that you are giving in this transaction and 
relating to the disclosure document? Have we given you 
access to the information you need? 
2. Have you explained to us all aspects of the structure or na-
ture of this transaction so that you are confident we fully un-
derstand all critical aspects? Does our official statement ad-
equately address any concerns you have about this 
transaction that a reasonable investor would consider im-
portant? 
3. Are there any matters regarding your participation in this 
transaction about which you should make us aware, in-
cluding potential conflicts of interest? 
4. Has your review of the relevant financial documents and 
other materials, including the official statement, raised 
any concerns regarding this borrowing? Do these concerns 
need to be disclosed? 
5. Are you aware of any circumstances in which we, our staff, 
or others have not complied with our procedures so that 
we can make sure that our official statement adequately 
and accurately describes this transaction? 
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